Annulment Funding Co Ltd v Cowey and another [2010] EWCA 711 First Plus Financial Group v Hewett [2010] EWCA Civ 312 by Halladay, John
 227 
Denning Law Journal 2009 Vol 23 pp 227-235 
 
CASE COMMENTARY 
 
 
RECENT PROBLEMS IN UNDUE INFLUENCE 
 
Annulment Funding Co Ltd v Cowey and another [2010] EWCA 711 
First Plus Financial Group v Hewett [2010] EWCA Civ 312 
 
John Halladay* 
 
After the flood of litigation at the end of the 20th Century, it was hoped 
that the House of Lords decisions in O’Brien1 and Etridge2 would put an end 
to the uncertainties facing those wishing to take security over a family home.  
But as seen in the recent Court of Appeal decisions in Annulment Funding Co 
Ltd v Cowey and another [2010] EWCA 711 (“Cowey”) and First Plus 
Financial Group v Hewett [2010] EWCA Civ 312 (“Hewett”), there still 
remain some interesting questions and potential problems for the unwary 
lender. 
 
ANNULMENT  FUNDING CO LTD V COWEY 
 
Facts 
 
In Cowey, Mr Cowley and Ms Cowlam were partners in a long established 
relationship and had a teenage son.  They were joint owners3 of a house in 
Dulwich where they lived. The house at the time in question was worth 
£800,000 and was subject to a first charge of £370,000, leaving an equity of 
£430,000. 
Mr Cowley did not manage his financial affairs well and was made 
subject to a bankruptcy order.4  Given that Mr Cowley owed about £120,000 
to creditors and that his share in the equity was worth £215,000, he was 
advised to seek an annulment of the bankruptcy.  He therefore approached the 
                                                     
* LLB (Toronto), LLM (Cantab), Barrister and Solicitor, Law Society of Upper 
Canada, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Buckingham. 
1 Barclays' Bank v O'Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 195, [1993] 4 All ER 417, 428. 
2 Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) [2001] UKHL 44, [2002] 2 AC 773, 
[2001] 4 All ER 449. 
3 It was assumed for the purposes of the case that they were equal beneficial owners. 
4 The petitioning creditor was Inland Revenue who were owed about £100,000. 
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claimant who was in the business of providing bridging financing on a short 
term basis until a more permanent mortgage could be arranged. 
On 3 July 2007, there was a meeting between a representative of the 
claimant, Mr Cowley, Ms Cowlam, a solicitor and an accountant instructed by 
Mr Cowley.  At the meeting, the claimant advanced the scheme that the 
couple would enter into a short term mortgage to annul the bankruptcy and 
also instruct an associated company of the claimant to act as a mortgage 
broker to obtain permanent mortgage financing.  Mr Cowley and Ms Cowlam 
executed the documents appointing the mortgage broker at the meeting.  
Subsequently, both Ms Cowley and Ms Cowlam signed documents which 
resulted in £138,000 being advanced, secured by a second charge on the 
house.  This loan was interest free for the first three months and at a rate of 
1.5% per month thereafter.  This money was eventually used to pay Mr 
Cowley’s creditors and resulted in the bankruptcy being annulled.  
In spite of the best efforts of the mortgage broker, new financing was not 
available.  This was due to the poor credit rating of Mr Cowley and because 
financial institutions were taking a more conservative approach to mortgages. 
So, the temporary mortgage was not paid off.  The claimant called in the loan 
which could not be repaid and then started proceedings against both Mr 
Cowley and Ms Cowlam to enforce its charge on the house. 
 
Decision 
 
The trial judge found that the charge had been entered into by Ms Cowlam 
as a result of the undue influence of Mr Cowley and that the claimant was 
bound by this fact so the charge had to be set aside as against Ms Cowlam.5  
There were various factors that acted on the trial judge’s findings of undue 
influence.  He found that while the claimant had not misrepresented the 
transaction to the couple, Mr Cowley did not understand the transaction and 
he passed this misunderstanding on to Ms Cowlam.  He found that Mr 
Cowley was under great pressure, and again he passed this pressure on to Ms 
Cowlam.  He found that Mr Cowley had acted with gross irresponsibility in 
looking after his own interests and then unduly influenced Ms Cowlam to act 
against her own interests. 
As an alternative to actual undue influence, the trial judge found that if 
actual undue influence had not been proven, it could be presumed on the facts. 
The claimant appealed on several grounds.  The first ground was that 
where the defence had relied on the presumption of undue influence it was not 
open for the judge to find actual undue influence.  The second ground was 
that there was insufficient evidence of actual undue influence. 
                                                     
5 The trial judge also refused to find that Ms Cowlam was liable as an unsecured 
creditor of the claimant. 
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Appeal 
 
(i) relationship between actual and presumed undue influence 
 
Morgan, J referred to passages from the judgements of Lord Nichols and 
Lord Scott in the leading case of Etridge.  He stated: 
 
“What that passage establishes is that an issue as to whether there was 
undue influence involves an issue of fact. The party asserting that 
there has been undue influence can call direct evidence which 
supports such a finding. Alternatively, that party can call evidence of 
other matters which justify the inference that undue influence was 
used. Either way, the party is attempting to prove the fact of undue 
influence.”6 
 
Thus, the defence can start by attempting to prove the presumption of 
undue influence and in the course of this produce evidence of actual undue 
influence.  The presumption is only a tool to answer the question of whether 
there had been undue influence so there was nothing wrong with the trial 
judge finding that undue influence had been proven, with or without the 
presumption.7 
 
(ii) no evidence of undue influence 
 
The second ground for appeal were that there was no evidence to support 
the finding of undue influence. 8  In reviewing the transcripts, most of the 
blame from Mr Cowley and Ms Cowlam was directed at the claimant’s 
behaviour, rather than at each other.  As a couple still living together, Ms 
Cowlam was reluctant to make the case that it was Mr Cowley’s fault.   While 
there was little evidence of undue influence, Morgan, J found that there was 
enough to uphold Ms Cowlam’s defence. Mr Cowley was under pressure and 
there was evidence that he had put pressure on Ms Cowlam to enter into the 
transaction.  In addition, Mr Cowley had misunderstood the nature of the 
                                                     
6 Cowley, at para 50. 
7 In E Peel Treital, The Law of Contract (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 12th ed, 2007)  p 
456, it is noted that while it is acceptable for a party to plead actual undue influence 
and the presumption of undue influence, it would not be acceptable for a judge to find 
no actual undue influence, but then use the presumption to find undue influence. 
8 There was some confusion which came from counsel for the claimant asserting she 
was not challenging the judge’s findings of primary fact. Morgan, J decided to review 
the transcripts of the trial in any event.    
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transaction and had misrepresented it to Ms Cowlam.  The trial judge had 
conflated these two findings to support his finding of undue influence.   
Morgan, J found that the several speeches in Etridge took different 
approaches.  Lord Nicholls9 appeared to use misrepresentation as a form of 
undue influence, whereas Lord Scott10 was careful to treat undue influence 
and misrepresentation as two separate wrongs.  But all agreed that the 
misrepresentation would allow a transaction to be set aside.  Morgan, J 
appeared to favour Lord Scott’s approach in finding that Mr Cowley’s 
misrepresentation to Ms Cowlam justified having the transaction set aside. 
 
FIRST PLUS FINANCIAL GROUP V HEWETT 
 
Facts 
 
Mr and Mrs Hewett lived in a house they jointly owned, together with 
their children and Mrs Hewett’s mother.  The main problems facing the 
family were financial, in particular Mr Hewett’s not uncommon ability to run 
up a huge credit card balance.  This balance became so large that the 
combined income of the Hewett’s was unable to cover the payments required.  
The solution was a refinancing and this required a charge over the house. 
Mrs Hewett was understandably troubled to be asked to risk her interest in 
the house to pay off her husband’s profligate spending but disaster was 
looming for him and this was the only way out.  Her husband swore on the 
lives of his children that he would amend his ways and limit his spending.  So 
Mrs Hewett was persuaded to sign the charge to First Plus. 
Unfortunately, things in the Hewett household deteriorated.  Mr Hewett 
continued his spending.  Worse than that, it emerged that at the time of the 
execution of the charge, he had been having an affair with another woman.  It 
also turned out that Mr Hewett had forged his mother-in-law’s signature as an 
occupant of the property on the charge.  Not exactly an ideal husband! 
Mr Hewett lost his job and stopped making payments to First City.  He 
moved out of the matrimonial home to live with the other woman.  He was 
convicted for the forgery and went bankrupt.  His trustee in bankruptcy sold 
his equity in the house to Mrs Hewett for a pound.  Thus, his role in the 
proceedings had come to an end. 
Mrs Hewett was unable to repay the charge and so First Plus brought an 
action for possession of the house.  Mrs Hewett defended the action.  She 
claimed that she had entered into the charge because of the undue influence of 
her husband and that since First City had not taken adequate steps to advise 
her, the transaction with Mrs Hewett could be set aside. 
                                                     
9 Etridge para 36. 
10 For example, Etridge, para 132. 
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Decision 
 
At trial, it was found that there was no undue influence.  The wife was in a 
difficult position and had hard decisions to make, but she had made up her 
mind freely and knew exactly what she was doing.  It therefore did not matter 
that First City had failed to take the steps to avoid constructive notice. 
This was overturned on appeal. Briggs, LJ, found that it would be wrong 
to limit undue influence to situations where one partner meekly submitted to 
the other.   The decision to be made by Mrs Hewett required the assumption 
that her husband was committed to the preservation of their home life and his 
affair carried with it a serious risk of this home life being disrupted.  Because 
of this, Mr Hewett’s affair “cried out for disclosure.”11 
Once it was found that Mr Hewett had unduly influenced his wife, First 
City’s failure to take steps to advise Mrs Hewett meant that it could be in “no 
better position”12 than the husband.  Therefore Mrs Hewett could have the 
mortgage set aside as against her own interest in the property at the time of 
the charge. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
(a) Misrepresentation and Non-disclosure 
 
Using misrepresentation as some kind of wrong akin to undue influence 
has been long recognised.  In O’Brien itself, the husband misrepresented that 
he has only liable for half the partnership loan.  This was sufficient to be 
treated as the same as undue influence. 
Both cases represent extensions to this idea.  Cowley is closer to O’Brien, 
but instead of a particular, material fact about the transaction as in O’Brien, in 
Cowley there is only a muddled Mr Cowley hoping that the transaction will 
lead to a permanent solution and Ms Cowlam being carried along in his belief.  
There is no finding of fraud and usually an innocent statement of intent, here 
the intention to find a permanent solution, would not be actionable as a 
misrepresentation.13 
In Hewitt, the husband failed to disclose a fact which was totally unrelated 
to the financial aspects of the mortgage.  The test put forward was “whether a 
solicitor, consulted by Mrs Hewett for advice about the wisdom of the 
transaction, would have thought it relevant to know that her husband was, 
while asking for her unqualified trust, at the same time conducting a 
                                                     
11 Hewett, para 33. 
12 Hewett, para 37. 
13 Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) LR 29 Ch D 459. 
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clandestine affair.”14  One thing that makes Hewett difficult is the lack of 
clarity with regard to what requires disclosure.  While an affair clearly 
destroys the relationship of trust, there is a large range of possibilities between 
absolute fidelity and an outright affair and many husbands will fall into this 
grey area.  What impure thoughts and actions need be disclosed? 
 
(b) Relationship of the Parties at the Time of the Trial 
 
Cowley and Hewett are opposite ends of the spectrum when it comes to 
the issue of the relationship of the parties at the time of trial.  Hewett is 
straightforward as the husband is gone and can be blamed for the transaction.  
Cowley is a much more difficult case as the couple are still living together and 
come to the courtroom arguing the same case.  In Cowley, the couple had the 
same legal representation at trial.15 On appeal, Morgan J only allowed the 
representative to act for Ms Cowlam but even he commented on the 
reluctance to give evidence of undue influence.  On the other hand, since the 
partners will have the same interest, there is equally the concern that they will 
collude in their evidence. 
 
(c) Likely Effect of Independent Legal Advice 
 
In both cases, the lender was put on enquiry because of its failure to insist 
that independent legal advice had been given to the partner.  It is therefore of 
interest to see what might have happened had the lender followed the 
recommended path. 
In Cowley, it is somewhat speculative as to what would have happened.  
As the case involves Ms Cowlam not understanding what she was doing, it 
may be that an independent lawyer might have stopped the transaction from 
happening and structured it in another way.  If this is the case, it is hard to 
know what Mr Cowley’s lawyer and accountant were doing as their advice 
did not stop him from proceeding without really understanding the 
transaction.  In fairness to them, there was little discussion of the role of the 
lawyer and the accountant so it is not known what advice they gave to Mr 
Cowley. 
In Hewett, it would seem that independent legal advice would not have 
made any difference.  While it is correct that he would have viewed it as 
relevant if told of the affair, a commercial solicitor acting for Mrs Hewett 
might have asked her if she felt her relationship with her husband would last, 
but short of insisting on hiring detectives to follow Mr Hewett, it is hard to see 
                                                     
14 Hewett, para 35. 
15 The legal representative was, in fact, a McKenzie friend. 
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how the affair would have been discovered.  So had the lender followed the 
correct procedure, it would not have made any difference to Mrs Hewett. 
 
(d) Why the Lender is affected? 
 
The logic of O’Brien was the legal fiction that the lender had 
“constructive notice” of the wrong. In Etridge, it was said that the lender is 
“put on enquiry” of the wrong committed, but this still involves a legal 
fiction.  How exactly this works is still a matter of some confusion.16  This 
continuing confusion is shown in Hewett where Briggs, J says: 
 
“For those reasons I consider that Mrs Hewett's decision to participate 
in the charge of the Property to First Plus was, as between herself and 
her husband, vitiated by his abuse of her trust. Since as the Judge 
found, First Plus is affected by such undue influence as may be proved 
to have occurred between husband and wife, it can be in no better 
position.”17 
 
He does not explain what the transaction was between the husband and the 
wife.  The transaction in question is the charge from the wife to the lender. 
The matter does not trouble the Court of Appeal in Cowley and there is 
little on the subject.  What Morgan, J says is: 
 
“At paras 79 to 82 of his first judgment, the judge then made his 
findings as to whether the Claimant was fixed with notice of the undue 
influence and he held that it was. It is not necessary to give further 
detail of his reasoning in this respect as it is not challenged on 
appeal.”18 
 
“Fixed with notice of the undue influence” seems to be returning to the 
O’Brien approach of “constructive notice” and so, if anything, leads to more 
confusion as to why the lender has its charge set aside. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In O'Brien, Lord Browne-Wilkinson's stated that his aim was to "restate 
the law in a form which is principled, reflects the current requirements of 
                                                     
16 Why the explanations of the doctrine do not work is well described in M Chen-
Wishart Contract Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) ch 9.3.4. 
17 Hewett at para 37. 
18 Cowley, at para 37. 
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society and provides as much certainty as possible."19  The lack of certainty 
flowing from O’Brien is demonstrated by the numerous cases which followed 
and eventually led to the decision in Etridge. 
Cowley and Hewett show that the uncertainty has not ended.  The obvious 
conclusion from Etridge is that lenders who do not demand a certificate of 
independent legal advice are in grave danger.  That much remains clear and 
what the lenders must do to be safe is also clear.  But the role of undue 
influence in all of this remains uncertain.  This perhaps gives us some insight 
into the source of the problem. 
If the courts wish to require lenders to give advice to the guaranteeing 
partner to a non-commercial loan, the only weapon available to them is to use 
some kind of idea of notice.  But by using the tool of “constructive notice” or 
“enquiry”, the courts must also find a “wrong” committed by one partner at 
the expense of the other.  In the search for the wrong, the courts have 
extended the range of what is wrong from undue pressure of one partner on 
the other to a variety of wrongs.20  Now we find that to be a bit muddled about 
your own finances in Cowley or to fail to tell of your extra-marital activities in 
Hewitt, is equivalent to “undue influence.”  
Undue influence is not really required to justify interference into this type 
of transaction. When it becomes necessary for one partner to guarantee the 
debts of the other and to mortgage the family home (whether to finance one 
partner’s business, pay off a credit card or otherwise), the family is at time of 
decision bordering on a crisis.  There is a lot of scope for undue pressure from 
one partner on the other in such circumstances.  But undue pressure is not 
necessary to make this a dangerous situation.  It is the situation itself that will 
be putting pressure on the parties and there is scope for either or both not to 
really understand what is going on in the transaction. 
Instead of focusing on the undue influence, perhaps the better approach 
would be just to focus on the advice to be given to the borrowers where they 
are raising non-purchase money21 secured by a family home.  It is important 
that people be allowed to raise finance based on such security,22 but it is 
equally important that both partners understand what they are doing.  This is 
consumer credit law rather than undue influence.  It would require statutory 
intervention to require lenders to give the correct advice in such 
circumstances.  But, rather than focusing on the wrongs committed by one 
partner against the other and making extensions of the law of undue influence 
                                                     
19 Barclays' Bank v O'Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 195, [1993] 4 All ER 417, 428. 
20 Five possibilities are listed in  N Andrews Contract Law (Cambridge :Cambridge 
University Press, 2011) p 332. 
21 The difficulties of applying these principles to an acquisition of the property is 
shown in Dunbar v Nadeem [1998] All ER (D) 282. 
22 Lord Bingham in Etridge para 2. 
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to prove such wrongs, the focus should be on what advice would be 
appropriate to give at the time of the mortgage.  That is not advice to 
minimise the risk of undue influence but rather advice that would be useful 
when making such a major decision.23 
One area would be basic business advice as was shown in Cowley.  Is this 
the best way to finance the transaction?  Do both partners have to give 
security?  Will the money raised be used for a good purpose?  How will the 
loan be repaid?  As was shown in Hewett, the other area might be family 
advice.  If I refuse my partner’s financial plans, one consequence may be the 
end of the relationship.  The partner may need emotional advice or may need 
family law advice as to their legal position on the termination of the 
relationship.  The technical advice set out in Etridge would have been of little 
help to Mrs Hewett but some relationship support might have been invaluable.  
It is very easy to say that an area of law is crying out for statutory reform 
and one can give credit to the various judges who have tried to create a 
workable scheme of useful advice in the absence of statutory intervention.  
But the solutions adopted require legal fictions which in turn create theoretical 
problems.  Cowley and Hewett show that these problems continue, especially 
for those who receive the Etridge advice and find it is of little help.  It is time 
for Parliament to look carefully at this area and sort it out. 
                                                     
23 S Gardner (‘Wives’ “Guarantees of their Husbands’ Debts”’) [1999] 115 LQR 1, 
questioned whether the value of the advice given was more than symbolic. 
